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Abstract
This article assesses the impact of conditional cash transfers, social pensions and 
other non-contributory transfers on different indicators of poverty and extreme poverty 
in Latin America, based on an analysis of household surveys from 15 countries in 
the region between 2014 and 2017. It is found that in 2017, the combined effect of 
non-contributory social protection programmes reduced simple regional averages 
for poverty by 2.0 percentage points and for extreme poverty by 1.7 percentage 
points, equivalent to relative decreases of 11.8% and 25.9%, respectively. It is also 
observed that surveys tend to capture fewer recipients of non-contributory transfers 
than administrative records. This undercapturing, as calculated for Brazil, may lead 
to underestimation of the impact of programmes, especially on indicators of severity 
and depth of poverty.
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I. Introduction
In recent decades, many Latin American countries have used non-contributory cash transfers —which 
do not depend on people’s ongoing or historical participation in the formal labour market— to alleviate 
poverty and reduce households’ exposure to various economic and social risks. These transfers are 
mainly financed with general income taxes —on the principle of solidarity— and resources generated 
by State-owned enterprises or originating from international cooperation. More recently, in the context 
of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, emergency cash transfers have been key to helping 
people cope with declines in labour income.
Non-contributory social protection (social assistance) seeks to guarantee a basic level of 
consumption for people living in extreme poverty and poverty —although there are also more universalistic 
programmes— and provide a link to the sectoral public services on offer. Although there is a very broad 
range of non-contributory social protection actions, two types of programmes are among the most 
important in the region, owing to their population coverage, their level of public spending and their 
effects on well-being: conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) and social pensions. In their basic 
format, CCTs provide cash transfers and services to households living in poverty and extreme poverty, 
under certain conditions, with the aim of improving the capacities of their members (mainly in education 
and health) and especially those of children and adolescents. Conditional cash transfers may be of 
a fixed amount, regardless of the structure of the family group (flat-rate transfers), but they are most 
frequently of a variable amount that is determined according to the structure of recipient households 
(larger amounts for families with more children) or the characteristics of the individual recipients, such 
as age, sex or area of residence. Transfers are made at different intervals, ranging from monthly to 
yearly; in some countries, such as Brazil and Chile, transfers are also provided without conditionalities 
other than the fact a family is living in extreme poverty.
Social pensions target older persons —mainly those living in poverty or not receiving contributory 
pensions— and persons with disabilities. The age threshold for being considered an older person varies 
from country to country and is sometimes different for men and women. Generally, social pensions 
consist of a fixed monthly amount, to support a basic level of consumption.
All non-contributory social protection programmes have systems for participant information and 
registration, generally managed by ministries of social development or planning. The records are used to 
create the roll of payment recipients and, in the case of CCTs, they can provide information on fulfilment 
of co-responsibilities in education and health (Ibarrarán and others, 2017). The records can also be used 
to assess the results and impact of programmes, as well as to carry out studies and research on poverty 
and vulnerability (Irarrázaval, 2011), which can contribute to improving transparency and accountability.
Non-contributory social protection programmes, especially CCTs, have been the subject of 
multiple impact assessments, which have sought to determine their effects on the recipient population, 
particularly in terms of income and consumption, use of social services, educational level and health 
and nutritional status. Quantitative methods have been the most common, such as quasi-experimental 
methods (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2011), which use data from administrative records, surveys specifically 
designed for this purpose or multipurpose household surveys conducted by the national statistical 
offices of the countries of the region on a periodic basis.
While there is great heterogeneity across countries and programmes, analyses based on 
household surveys have generally found that the poverty reduction effects and redistributive impact are 
both limited. In their analysis of nine countries in around 2010, Cruces and Gasparini (2013) found that 
the poverty headcount ratio, measured with a U$ 4 a day poverty line, declined by between 0.2 and 
3.6 percentage points because of non-contributory social protection programmes, including conditional 
cash transfers and social pensions. They concluded that the impact is greater when poverty is measured 
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with indicators that give greater weight to the lowest strata of the income distribution. Similarly, for eight 
Latin American countries, Amarante and Brun (2018) found that around 2013 the poverty headcount 
ratio fell by between 0.02 and 2.84 percentage points because of CCTs.
One reason for these limited effects may be the low amounts transferred. Another may be inadequate 
coverage. Robles, Rubio and Stampini (2015), based on household survey data, found considerable 
exclusion errors in CCTs and social pensions in the region in relation to the total population living in 
extreme monetary poverty and monetary poverty. This is because of the design of the programmes 
—which tend to exclude households without children or older people— their small size, imperfect 
targeting mechanisms (especially in relation to the characteristics of urban poverty) and difficulty reaching 
the poorest households (Robles, Rubio and Stampini, 2015).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency cash transfers have covered large sectors 
of the population and have played an important role in containing the increase in poverty and extreme 
poverty resulting from the loss of income from work.1 According to projections by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2021), taking into account emergency 
cash transfers, the headcount ratios for poverty and extreme poverty in Latin America in 2020 were, 
respectively, 3.5 and 3.3 percentage points lower than projected without taking these particular transfers 
into account. These are reductions in relative terms of 9.4% in poverty and of 20.9% in extreme poverty, 
with respect to the values that would have been reached without the transfers.2 In some countries, 
such as Brazil, the extent and coverage of the transfers appear to have resulted in lower poverty than 
in the prior year, despite the declines in labour income.
With respect to existing studies, this article expands geographic and temporal coverage by 
analysing data from 15 countries for the period from 2014 to 2017. It also explores the extent to which 
the coverage of social programmes in household surveys has a bearing on the undercapturing of their 
impact on poverty and extreme poverty. As Villatoro and Cecchini (2018) argue, there are discrepancies 
between surveys and administrative records in the capturing of recipients and amounts of non-contributory 
transfers. Indeed, there is conclusive information that surveys tend to capture fewer recipients and less 
total income transferred than administrative records.
The rest of the article is divided into five sections. Section II provides a regional overview of 
coverage and amounts of non-contributory cash transfers. Section III presents the observed values for 
the headcount indicator, the gaps and severity for poverty and extreme poverty, and the values that 
would be observed in the absence of non-contributory transfers in the countries covered, using the 
poverty and extreme poverty lines calculated by ECLAC in order to provide comparable measurements 
(ECLAC, 2018a and 2019). Section IV analyses the discrepancies between the number of recipients 
of non-contributory transfers captured by administrative records and the number captured by surveys. 
Section V measures the effect of non-contributory cash transfers on the various indicators of poverty 
and extreme poverty for Brazil, adjusting the information collected in the surveys to take into account 
the number of recipients and the amount of transfers reported in administrative records. Section VI 
presents the conclusions of the study.
1 ECLAC (2021) has estimated that emergency cash transfers, together with in-kind transfers, reached 60.8% of the population of 
Latin America in 2020, with expenditure of 1.55% of GDP. However, the amounts, duration and population coverage of transfer 
programmes have varied greatly from country to country.
2 The values presented by ECLAC (2021) correspond to a simulation (weighted average of 18 countries) and are not comparable 
with the results presented in table 2 of this study, which lists direct measurements (simple average of 15 countries).
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II. Background: coverage and amounts 
of non-contributory transfers
Table 1 lists the non-contributory transfer programmes analysed and the data sources used. The study 
covers 15 countries in the region with information for the period from 2014 to 2017, and includes 
conditional cash transfers, social pensions and other non-contributory programmes.
Table 1 
Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): household surveys used and non-contributory 
transfer programmes analysed
Country Survey and years
Programmesa
Conditional cash transfers Social pensions Other
Argentina Permanent Household Survey, 







Continuous Household Survey, 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015
Juancito Pinto Grant
Juana Azurduy Grant
Renta Dignidad  
(old-age pension)
Brazilc National Household Survey 
(PNAD), 2014, 2015, 
2016 and 2017
Bolsa Família Continuous Benefit 
Programme (BPC)
Other State transfers
Chile National Socioeconomic 
Survey (CASEN), 2011, 
2013, 2015 and 2017
Ethical Family Income 
Chile Solidario















Colombia Large-scale Integrated 
Household Survey (GEIH), 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017
Más Familias en 
Acción (family grant)
Jóvenes en Acción 
(youth grant)
Colombia Mayor (older 
adult social protection 
programme)
Costa Rica Multipurpose Household Survey, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017
Avancemos Non-contributory 
Pension Scheme
Joint Institute for Social 






Continuous National Labour 
Force Survey (ENCFT), 2014, 




for the Protection 
of Older Persons 
Ecuador National Survey of Employment, 
Unemployment and 
Underemployment (ENEMDU), 




Grant — Older Persons
Joaquín Gallegos Grant for 
persons with disabilities
El Salvador Multipurpose Household Survey, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017
Comunidades Solidarias Basic Universal Pension Other State transfers
Honduras Permanent Multipurpose 
Household Survey, 2013, 




Grant for persons with 
disabilities, grants, other 
government programmes
Mexico Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (ENIGH), 










Other programs for older persons
Other social programmes
Panama Labour Market Survey, 2014, 
2015, 2016 and 2017
Opportunities Network
Grant for Food Purchase 
programme
120 a los 65 programme Guardian Angel Programme
Universal Grant
Public Institution grants 
Paraguay Permanent Household Survey, 
2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017
Tekoporã Food Allowance for Older 
Persons Living in Poverty
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Table 1 (concluded)
Country Survey and years
Programmesa
Conditional cash transfers Social pensions Other
Peru National Survey of Households, 
Living Conditions and Poverty, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017
National Programme 
of Direct Support for 
the Poorest (Juntos)
Pension 65
Uruguay Continuous Household Survey, 






Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Not all transfer programmes are included in all survey rounds. In some cases, the names do not identify programmes, but 
income streams.
b The survey asks about receipt of government aid, without identifying specific programmes.
c The survey only captured Bolsa Família, the Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC) and other State transfers separately in 2016 
and 2017. For 2014 and 2015, recipients of these two programmes were identified using an indirect method.
d To identify the recipients of Progresando con Solidaridad in 2014 and 2015 it was assumed that all income from the government 
aid stream came from that programme.
To estimate the coverage and amounts of non-contributory transfers in countries where surveys 
do not include direct questions to identify recipients, indirect identification was used, a procedure 
employed in some previous studies.3 This entailed: (i) determining the income stream containing the 
transfers; (ii) setting transfer values that approximate or match the amounts delivered by the programme; 
and (iii) establishing filter criteria to exclude ineligible households or individuals.4
Based on household surveys, the coverage of non-contributory transfer programmes in the region 
is estimated to be significant. Around 2017, the population living in households receiving non-contributory 
transfers represented 28% of the total population of the 15 countries covered (simple average).5
There is also considerable heterogeneity across countries in terms of coverage of non-contributory 
transfers. In the 2014–2017 period, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Panama and Chile were the 
countries with the highest coverage of the population through non-contributory transfers, while El 
Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay had the lowest (see figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the coverage of conditional cash transfers, social pensions and other transfers, 
as well as the amounts of transfers as a proportion of total income of recipient households, considering 
values in around 2017. In the vast majority of countries, conditional cash transfers have higher coverage 
of the total population than social pensions, while the amounts of social pensions tend to be higher than 
those of conditional cash transfers. Transfer amounts are low across the board, despite considerable 
differences between countries.
3 For Brazil see Paes de Barros, de Carvalho and Franco (2007), Soares and others (2007) and Guimarães Ferreira de Souza (2013), 
and for Argentina see Bustos and Villafañe (2011). 
4 For details on the questions included in the surveys and the procedures used for measuring non-contributory transfers, see 
table A1.1 of the annex. 
5 The coverage of the programmes may actually be higher, owing to the problems of undercapturing of recipients that affect the 
surveys (see section IV of this article).
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Figure 1 
Latin America (15 countries): coverage of non-contributory transfers, on the basis  
of information from household surveys, around 2014 to around 2017
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Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a Percentage of population living in households receiving non-contributory transfers (conditional cash transfers, social pensions 
and other State transfers).
b 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017.
c 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
d 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
e 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.
f 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016.
To assess whether non-contributory transfers are sufficient to enable households to overcome 
poverty and extreme poverty, the average per capita amount received by households is compared 
with the average per capita income deficit affecting people living in poverty and extreme poverty, 
taking into account household income before non-contributory transfers.6 Between 2014 and 2017, 
non-contributory transfers amounted to less than the average income deficit of the poor relative to the 
total poverty line in the 15 countries analysed; in other words, on average they were not sufficient to 
close the gap between the autonomous income of poor households and the poverty line. The lowest 
amounts in relation to the average income deficit were observed in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
El Salvador, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. The largest amounts were found in Uruguay, Brazil, 
Costa Rica and Paraguay (see figure 3).
6 The income deficit refers to the distance between monthly per capita household income and the poverty or extreme poverty 
line. If monthly per capita non-contributory transfers equal or exceed this deficit, they enable households to overcome poverty 
or extreme poverty. In some countries, there are transfers whose amount is calculated in such a way as to supplement families’ 
income enough for their monthly per capita income to rise above the extreme poverty line, as in the case of the Bolsa Família 
grant to reduce extreme poverty in Brazil or the Bono Base Familiar grant of the Chile Seguridades y Oportunidades programme 
in Chile.
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Figure 2 
Latin America (13 countries): coverage and amounts of non-contributory transfers by type  
of programme, on the basis of information from household surveys, around 2017a
A. Coverage by type of programme



















































































































Conditional cash transfersSocial pensionsOther transfersTwo or more programmes
B. Amounts by type of programme














































































































Conditional cash transfersSocial pensionsOther transfers
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The data refer to 2017, except for Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Honduras, where they refer to 2015, and Mexico, where 
they refer to 2016.
b Percentage of total population living in recipient households.
c This indicator expresses, for each of the programmes, the average per capita household transfer as a percentage of the total 
average per capita income of recipient households.
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Figure 3 
Latin America (15 countries): amounts of non-contributory transfers relative to the income 
deficitsa of the poor and extremely poor populations, based on information from household 
surveys, around 2014 to around 2017b





















































































































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The income deficit is the distance between monthly per capita household income and the poverty or extreme poverty line.
b 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017.
c 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
d 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.
e 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.
f 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016.
In Uruguay, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Brazil, the average amount of non-contributory transfers 
more than closed the income deficit with respect to the extreme poverty line. The lowest amounts were 
observed in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia and the Dominican Republic.
The amounts of social pensions are sufficient to cover, in the vast majority of countries, a much 
larger proportion of the poor population’s income deficit than the amounts of conditional cash transfers. 
In around 2017, the largest social pensions were provided in Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Paraguay, with amounts equivalent to more than 100% of the income deficits of those living in poverty. 
The lowest social pensions were provided in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Colombia and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (see figure 4).
Conditional cash transfers, in around 2017, were of the highest amounts with respect to the 
income deficits of the poor population in Uruguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Brazil. The proportionally 
lowest amounts were found in the Plurinational State of Bolivia and El Salvador.
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Figure 4 
Latin America (13 countries): amounts of conditional cash transfers and social pensions 
relative to the income deficita of the population living in poverty, on the basis  
of information from household surveys, around 2017b

























































































Conditional cash transfers Social pensions
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The income deficit is the distance between monthly per capita household income and the poverty line.
b The data refer to 2017, except for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where they refer to 2015, and Mexico, where they refer 
to 2016.
III. The direct impact of non-contributory 
transfers on poverty
This section assesses the direct impact of non-contributory transfers on poverty in 15 countries in the 
region between 2014 and 2017, comparing the incidence (or headcount ratio), depth (or gap) and 
severity (or squared gap) of poverty in the total population, with and without non-contributory transfers.7 
An analysis is also provided that disaggregates by type of programme.
The assessment of the direct impact of non-contributory transfers on poverty assumes that the 
programmes have no effect on households’ decisions concerning reproduction and labour participation, 
an assumption that could lead to overestimation of the impact. However, this assumption is empirically 
supported in the literature. Results from impact assessments conducted in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay (ECLAC, 2017) and from randomized controlled 
trials in Latin America (Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua), Asia (Philippines and Indonesia) and Africa 
(Morocco) show that cash transfer programmes do not disincentivize labour participation (Banerjee and 
others, 2016). In addition, a meta-analysis of conditional cash transfer programmes shows that there 
is generally no impact on fertility (Bastagli and others, 2016).
7 The monetary poverty indicators used in this article are from the class of parametric measures proposed by Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984): the headcount ratio (FGT0), which corresponds to the percentage of people living in poverty; the poverty gap 
(FGT1), which weights the percentage of people living in poverty according the average distance between their income and the 
poverty line, and the squared poverty gap (FGT2), which accounts for the distribution of income among people living in poverty.
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The results of the analysis of the direct impact on reducing the headcount ratios for poverty 
and extreme poverty are presented in table 2. The differences between the situations with and without 
transfers are presented in absolute values (percentage points) and relative values. In the latter case, the 
difference is expressed as a percentage with regard to poverty rates without transfers.
Table 2 
Latin America (15 countries): headcount ratios for poverty and extreme poverty in the total 
population, with and without non-contributory transfers, around 2014 to around 2017























Argentina 2017 2.8 3.3 -0.5 -15.2 18.7 20.7 -2.0 -9.7
2016 3.0 3.6 -0.6 -16.7 22.9 24.3 -1.4 -5.8
2014 3.4 3.9 -0.5 -12.8 25.2 26.6 -1.4 -5.3




2015 15.0 16.8 -1.8 -10.7 35.4 36.7 -1.3 -3.5
2014 15.3 16.9 -1.6 -9.5 34.3 36.0 -1.7 -4.7
2013 15.9 18.3 -2.4 -13.1 34.5 35.9 -1.4 -3.9
2012 16.8 18.4 -1.6 -8.7 36.3 37.3 -1.0 -2.7
Brazil 2017 5.5 8.4 -2.9 -34.5 19.9 22.7 -2.8 -12.3
2016 5.1 8.1 -3.0 -37.0 19.5 22.3 -2.8 -12.6
2015 4.0 6.4 -2.4 -37.5 18.8 21.7 -2.9 -13.4
2014 3.3 5.6 -2.3 -41.1 16.5 19.5 -3.0 -15.4
Chile 2017 1.4 2.6 -1.2 -46.2 10.7 14.0 -3.3 -23.6
2015 1.7 3.1 -1.4 -45.2 13.6 17.0 -3.4 -20.0
2013 2.0 3.7 -1.7 -45.9 16.1 19.3 -3.2 -16.6
2011 3.1 4.8 -1.7 -35.4 25.0 27.9 -2.9 -10.4
Colombia 2017 10.9 12.2 -1.3 -10.7 29.8 30.9 -1.1 -3.6
2016 12.0 13.4 -1.4 -10.4 30.8 31.8 -1.0 -3.1
2015 11.3 13.0 -1.7 -13.1 30.6 31.9 -1.3 -4.1
2014 11.9 13.6 -1.7 -12.5 30.9 32.3 -1.4 -4.3
Costa Rica 2017 3.3 6.0 -2.7 -45.0 15.1 19.1 -4.0 -20.9
2016 4.2 6.8 -2.6 -38.2 16.7 20.3 -3.6 -17.7
2015 4.5 6.7 -2.2 -32.8 17.2 20.2 -3.0 -14.9
2014 4.1 6.7 -2.6 -38.8 18.0 20.9 -2.9 -13.9
Dominican 
Republic
2017 8.5 9.6 -1.1 -11.5 28.2 29.7 -1.5 -5.1
2016 9.5 10.6 -1.1 -10.4 29.2 30.3 -1.1 -3.6
2015 9.4 10.6 -1.2 -11.3 30.3 31.4 -1.1 -3.5
2014 9.7 10.9 -1.2 -11.0 33.2 34.6 -1.4 -4.0
Ecuador 2017 6.2 8.0 -1.8 -22.5 22.8 24.8 -2.0 -8.1
2016 7.3 9.2 -1.9 -20.7 25.8 27.5 -1.7 -6.2
2015 7.2 9.3 -2.1 -22.6 25.6 27.6 -2.0 -7.2
2014 6.5 8.4 -1.9 -22.6 25.8 27.8 -2.0 -7.2
El Salvador 2017 8.3 8.7 -0.4 -4.6 37.8 37.9 -0.1 -0.3
2016 10.5 10.9 -0.4 -3.7 40.1 40.4 -0.3 -0.7
2015 10.4 10.8 -0.4 -3.7 42.3 42.5 -0.2 -0.5
2014 11.6 11.9 -0.3 -2.5 44.3 44.4 -0.1 -0.2
Honduras 2016 18.5 18.6 -0.1 -0.5 53.0 53.2 -0.2 -0.4
2015 18.9 20.3 -1.4 -6.9 55.0 55.5 -0.5 -0.9
2014 19.3 20.5 -1.2 -5.9 55.3 55.6 -0.3 -0.5
2013 22.6 23.8 -1.2 -5.0 59.1 59.7 -0.6 -1.0
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Mexico 2016 11.9 14.6 -2.7 -18.5 44.3 46.1 -1.8 -3.9
2014 13.4 16.8 -3.4 -20.2 45.7 47.6 -1.9 -4.0
2012 13.5 16.1 -2.6 -16.1 45.0 46.4 -1.4 -3.0
2010 12.8 15.3 -2.5 -16.3 44.8 45.9 -1.1 -2.4
Panama 2017 7.6 11.7 -4.1 -35.0 16.7 20.7 -4.0 -19.3
2016 8.4 12.4 -4.0 -32.3 17.4 21.6 -4.2 -19.4
2015 7.9 12.3 -4.4 -35.8 18.2 22.0 -3.8 -17.3
2014 9.1 12.1 -3.0 -24.8 20.2 23.0 -2.8 -12.2
Paraguay 2017 6.0 8.1 -2.1 -25.9 21.6 23.6 -2.0 -8.5
2016 8.1 9.8 -1.7 -17.3 24.4 25.9 -1.5 -5.8
2014 7.8 8.8 -1.0 -11.4 22.8 23.9 -1.1 -4.6
2013 7.3 8.3 -1.0 -12.0 23.3 24.0 -0.7 -2.9
Peru 2017 5.0 6.6 -1.6 -24.2 18.9 20.5 -1.6 -7.8
2016 8.4 10.2 -1.8 -17.6 25.6 26.9 -1.3 -4.8
2015 8.5 10.4 -1.9 -18.3 26.0 27.3 -1.3 -4.8
2014 8.6 10.1 -1.5 -14.9 26.3 27.3 -1.0 -3.7
Uruguay 2017 0.1 0.6 -0.5 -83.3 2.7 5.4 -2.7 -50.0
2016 0.2 0.7 -0.5 -71.4 3.7 6.4 -2.7 -42.2
2015 0.2 0.8 -0.6 -75.0 4.3 7.1 -2.8 -39.4
2014 0.2 0.9 -0.7 -77.8 4.7 7.4 -2.7 -36.5
Simple 
average
2017 7.4 9.1 -1.7 -25.9 25.0 27.1 -2.0 -11.8
2016 8.4 10.2 -1.8 -23.8 27.0 28.9 -1.9 -10.1
2015 8.4 10.1 -1.8 -23.7 27.5 29.3 -1.8 -9.3
2014 8.7 10.3 -1.6 -22.6 28.8 30.4 -1.7 -8.1
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
As a simple average for the 15 countries analysed, it was found that, in absolute terms, in 
2017 transfers contributed to reducing extreme poverty by 1.7 percentage points and poverty by 2.0 
percentage points. This equates to a relative reduction in the extreme poverty rate of 25.9% and in 
the poverty rate of 11.8%. In relative terms, the impact has increased slightly but steadily since 2014.
The direct impact of non-contributory transfers on total poverty, measured in absolute and 
relative values, is greater in countries where the poverty headcount ratio without transfers is lower. The 
countries where transfers reduced total poverty the most in absolute terms were Panama, Costa Rica 
and Chile, with effects of more than 3.0 percentage points, followed closely by Brazil and Uruguay. In 
the remaining countries, the average reduction in poverty ranged from 0.2 to 1.9 percentage points.
Analysing the relative impact of transfers on total poverty, the greatest simple average effect for 
the four survey rounds, by far, was found in Uruguay (-42%), followed by Chile, Panama, Costa Rica 
and Brazil, with reductions of between 18% and 13%. In the rest of the countries, which have higher 
poverty headcount ratios without transfers, the relative effect did not exceed 7%.
In the case of extreme poverty, the largest absolute reductions through transfers were found in 
Panama, Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica (2.5 percentage points or more). In terms of relative impact, in 
countries with extreme poverty levels without transfers of below 10% (on average for the four survey 
rounds), the relative reduction was 36% on average. In countries with extreme poverty headcount ratios 
above 10%, the relative reduction was only 13%.
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The information in table 2 also shows that the relative impact of non-contributory transfers was, 
in almost all the countries and years analysed, more significant in reducing extreme poverty than total 
poverty. This explains why the direct impact of transfers is systematically greater in reducing the severity 
and depth of poverty than in reducing the headcount ratio for total poverty (see figure 5). These results 
corroborate the findings of Cruces and Gasparini (2013) and Amarante and Brun (2018).
Figure 5 
Latin America (15 countries): reduction in the headcount ratio, depth and severitya of poverty 











































































Headcount ratio ( FGT
0 
) Depth ( FGT
1 











Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The headcount ratio corresponds to the percentage of people living in poverty; depth is the weighting of the percentage of 
people living in poverty according to the average distance between their income and the poverty line; and severity refers to the 
way in which income is distributed among people living in poverty.
b The relative rate is obtained by dividing the absolute difference between the poverty indicators with and without transfers by 
the value of the poverty indicator with transfers (baseline). The result is multiplied by 100.
An analysis of the impact of conditional cash transfer programmes alone shows that, as a simple 
average for 14 countries in the region, there were reductions of 0.7 percentage points (absolute value) 
and 13% (relative value) in extreme poverty in 2017, and reductions of 0.8 percentage points and 5.1% 
in poverty (see table 3).
The largest absolute reductions in total poverty occurred in Argentina, Brazil and the Dominican 
Republic, while the largest reductions in extreme poverty occurred in Mexico and Brazil. The most 
significant relative impacts of conditional transfers on both extreme and total poverty were found in 
Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil.
In terms of the impact of social pensions on total poverty, the simple average for 14 countries 
in the region in 2017 shows reductions of 0.8 percentage points and 11.9% for extreme poverty and 
0.9 percentage points and 4.8% for poverty (see table 4).8
8 The 14 countries analysed are not the same as those examined in the case of conditional cash transfer programmes, so it is 
not advisable to compare the regional averages with those programmes.
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Table 3 
Latin America (15 countries): headcount ratio for poverty and extreme poverty in the total 
population, with and without conditional cash transfers, around 2016 to around 2017
(Percentages and percentage points)
Country Year





















Argentina 2017 2.8 3.3 -0.5 -15.2 18.7 20.6 -1.9 -9.2




2015 15.0 15.3 -0.3 -2.0 35.4 35.5 -0.1 -0.3
2014 15.3 15.5 -0.2 -1.3 34.3 34.8 -0.5 -1.4
Brazil 2017 5.5 7.2 -1.7 -23.6 19.9 21.3 -1.4 -6.6
2016 5.1 6.9 -1.8 -26.1 19.5 20.9 -1.4 -6.7
Chile 2017 1.4 1.5 -0.1 -6.7 10.7 10.9 -0.2 -1.8
2015 1.7 1.8 -0.1 -5.6 13.6 13.8 -0.2 -1.4
Colombia 2017 10.9 11.8 -0.9 -7.6 29.8 30.5 -0.7 -2.3
2016 12.0 12.9 -0.9 -7.0 30.8 31.4 -0.6 -1.9
Costa Rica 2017 3.3 3.7 -0.4 -10.8 15.1 15.9 -0.8 -5.0
2016 4.2 4.6 -0.4 -8.7 16.7 17.2 -0.5 -2.9
Dominican 
Republic
2017 8.5 9.6 -1.1 -11.5 28.2 29.7 -1.5 -5.1
2016 9.5 10.5 -1.0 -9.5 29.2 30.3 -1.1 -3.6
Ecuador 2017 6.2 7.2 -1.0 -13.9 22.8 23.8 -1.0 -4.2
2016 7.3 8.4 -1.1 -13.1 25.8 26.6 -0.8 -3.0
El Salvador 2017 8.3 8.5 -0.2 -2.4 37.8 37.8 0.0 0.0
2016 10.5 10.7 -0.2 -1.9 40.1 40.3 -0.2 -0.5
Honduras 2016 18.5 18.6 -0.1 -0.5 53.0 53.1 -0.1 -0.2
2015 18.9 20.3 -1.4 -6.9 55.0 55.4 -0.4 -0.7
Mexico 2016 11.9 13.6 -1.7 -12.5 44.3 45.2 -0.9 -2.0
2014 13.4 15.6 -2.2 -14.1 45.7 46.6 -0.9 -1.9
Panama 2017 7.6 8.2 -0.6 -7.3 16.7 17.0 -0.3 -1.8
2016 8.4 9.0 -0.6 -6.7 17.4 17.6 -0.2 -1.1
Paraguay 2017 6.0 6.9 -0.9 -13.0 21.6 22.4 -0.8 -3.6
2016 8.1 8.9 -0.8 -9.0 24.4 24.9 -0.5 -2.0
Peru 2017 5.0 5.9 -0.9 -15.3 18.9 19.7 -0.8 -4.1
2016 8.4 9.4 -1.0 -10.6 25.6 26.1 -0.5 -1.9
Uruguay 2017 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -50.0 2.7 3.9 -1.2 -30.8
2016 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -33.3 3.7 4.8 -1.1 -22.9
Simple average 2017 7.7 8.4 -0.7 -13.0 25.8 26.5 -0.8 -5.1
2016 8.7 9.6 -0.9 -11.6 27.7 28.4 -0.7 -3.9
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).The largest absolute declines 
in total poverty occurred in Panama, Costa Rica and Brazil. In the case of extreme poverty, the 
largest declines were found in Panama, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Brazil.
The effect of social pensions on total poverty and extreme poverty in relative terms was greatest 
in Uruguay, Chile, Panama and Costa Rica (see table 4).
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A comparison of the relative impact on poverty of social pensions and conditional cash transfers 
shows varying results from country to country (see figure 6), depending the amounts of transfers, population 
coverage and the quality of programme targeting.9 In Chile and Panama, the effect of social pensions 
exceeds that of conditional cash transfers by 12.6% and 7.9%, respectively. In contrast, in Uruguay 
and the Dominican Republic, the impact of conditional cash transfers exceeds that of social pensions 
by 6.5% and 4.3%, respectively. In half of the countries, the difference between the impact on total 
poverty of social pensions and conditional cash transfers is 1.0% or less (average of 2016 and 2017).
Table 4 
Latin America (13 countries): headcount ratios for poverty and extreme poverty in the total 
population, with and without social pensions, around 2016 to around 2017
(Percentages and percentage points)
Country Year
























2015 15.0 16.4 -1.4 -8.5 35.4 36.5 -1.1 -3.0
2014 15.3 16.6 -1.3 -7.8 34.3 35.6 -1.3 -3.7
Brazil 2017 5.5 6.6 -1.1 -16.7 19.9 21.2 -1.3 -6.1
2016 5.1 6.1 -1.0 -16.4 19.5 20.9 -1.4 -6.7
Chile 2017 1.4 2.1 -0.7 -33.3 10.7 12.7 -2.0 -15.7
2015 1.7 2.5 -0.8 -32.0 13.6 15.6 -2.0 -12.8
Colombia 2017 10.9 11.3 -0.4 -3.5 29.8 30.2 -0.4 -1.3
2016 12.0 12.4 -0.4 -3.2 30.8 31.2 -0.4 -1.3
Costa Rica 2017 3.3 4.1 -0.8 -19.5 15.1 16.6 -1.5 -9.0
2016 4.2 5.2 -1.0 -19.2 16.7 18.1 -1.4 -7.7
Dominican 
Republic
2017 8.5 8.5 0.0 0.0 28.2 28.2 0.0 0.0
2016 9.5 9.5 0.0 0.0 29.2 29.2 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 2017 6.2 6.8 -0.6 -8.8 22.8 23.5 -0.7 -3.0
2016 7.3 8.0 -0.7 -8.8 25.8 26.5 -0.7 -2.6
El Salvador 2017 8.3 8.5 -0.2 -2.4 37.8 37.8 0.0 0.0
2016 10.5 10.7 -0.2 -1.9 40.1 40.3 -0.2 -0.5
Mexico 2016 11.9 12.4 -0.5 -4.0 44.3 44.8 -0.5 -1.1
2014 13.4 14.1 -0.7 -5.0 45.7 46.1 -0.4 -0.9
Panama 2017 7.6 9.1 -1.5 -16.5 16.7 18.4 -1.7 -9.2
2016 8.4 9.9 -1.5 -15.2 17.4 19.2 -1.8 -9.4
Paraguay 2017 6.0 7.3 -1.3 -17.8 21.6 22.8 -1.2 -5.3
2016 8.1 9.0 -0.9 -10.0 24.4 25.4 -1.0 -3.9
Peru 2017 5.0 5.7 -0.7 -12.3 18.9 19.7 -0.8 -4.1
2016 8.4 9.3 -0.9 -9.7 25.6 26.3 -0.7 -2.7
Uruguay 2017 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -50.0 2.7 3.5 -0.8 -22.9
2016 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -33.3 3.7 4.5 -0.8 -17.8
Simple average 2017 7.5 8.2 -0.8 -11.9 25.1 26.0 -0.9 -4.8
2016 8.7 9.4 -0.8 -10.8 26.9 27.9 -0.9 -4.4
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
9 For example, in Panama the amount of the social pension transfer is US$ 120 per month, compared with US$ 50 in the case 
of the Opportunities Network (CCT programme), and in the Plurinational State of Bolivia the Renta Dignidad social pension 
provides 210 bolivianos per month, while the Juancito Pinto Grant (CCT programme) provides 200 bolivianos per year. In 
the Dominican Republic, while conditional cash transfers through the Progresando con Solidaridad programme cover 3.5 million 
people, the old-age, disability and survivors’ solidarity pensions have very limited coverage. Inclusion and exclusion errors also 
vary from programme to programme; in this regard, see Robles, Rubio and Stampini (2015).
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Figure 6 
Latin America (13 countries): reduction in the headcount ratios for poverty  
and extreme poverty owing to the effect of conditional cash transfers  
and social pensions, around 2016 and 2017






























































































































































































Social pensions Conditional cash transfers
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The relative rate is obtained by dividing the absolute difference between the poverty indicators with and without transfers by 
the value of the poverty indicator with transfers (baseline). The result is multiplied by 100.
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The heterogeneity among countries is greater when comparing the relative impact of the two 
types of programmes on extreme poverty. In Chile, the effect of pensions exceeds that of conditional 
cash transfers by 26.6%, and in the Dominican Republic, the impact of conditional cash transfers is 
10.5% greater than that of social pensions. In Mexico and Panama, the difference between the effect 
of the two programmes is 8.8%; in the former, conditional cash transfers have a greater impact, and 
in the latter, the social pension has a greater impact. In Brazil, the impact of conditional cash transfers 
exceeds that of the social pension by 8.3%, and in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the impact of the 
social pension exceeds that of conditional transfers by 6.6%.
IV. Discrepancies between capture of 
transfer recipients in surveys and 
in administrative records
In the region, the direct impact of non-contributory transfers on poverty has been assessed on the 
basis of surveys. However, recent information on developed countries shows that surveys capture 
fewer recipients of State transfers than administrative records (Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2015; Meyer 
and Mittag, 2016).
As discussed in Villatoro and Cecchini (2018), the errors that lead to undercapturing of transfers 
in surveys are: (i) coverage error, which occurs when the survey’s sampling frame does not include the 
entire population; this error occurs when certain territories, households or persons are excluded from the 
sampling frame; (ii) unit or total non-response, which occurs when a selected household refuses to be 
interviewed; (iii) item or partial non-response, which occurs when a household participates in the survey 
but does not answer one or more income questions; and (iv) measurement error, which occurs when 
respondents give incorrect answers about their income. This last error is partly because of cognitive 
failures, as respondents may confuse or forget the names of programmes and may not remember when 
they received transfers. Another reason is intentional underreporting, which in the ethnographic literature 
from developed countries has been linked to the stigma associated with receiving social assistance. 
In Latin America, the precarious living conditions of the poorest, the selectivity of social programmes, 
the lack of understanding of the purposes of the surveys and the belief that the information will not be 
treated confidentially may encourage respondents not to declare income (Feres and Villatoro, 2012). 
Instrumentation and mode of survey implementation can also lead to response and measurement 
errors. The wording and order of questions and the length of interviews affect the interpretation of the 
questions and interviewees’ motivation to respond (Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri, 2008). Interviewer 
and interviewee characteristics may also play a role (Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2015).
However, administrative records are not completely reliable. Unlike surveys, the data collection 
process for records is usually not monitored in developing countries (World Bank, 2015). Furthermore, 
information from records that is not essential for management is of lower quality (Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 
2015; Mittag, 2012). In any case, as the delivery of transfers is the main task of non-contributory transfer 
programmes, information on such transfers and on recipients should be more reliable than other data 
that is less important for management.
In addition to the above limitation, the two sources are not fully comparable. Some of the 
discrepancies between records and surveys are to be expected, owing to their different purposes, 
procedures and reporting modes (Guimarães Ferreira de Souza, 2013; Groen, 2012). Records exist 
to support management, while surveys are designed for research and to represent a broader segment 
of the population (World Bank, 2015). In addition, the populations and reference periods of the two 
sources often do not match exactly (Groen, 2012).
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In recent years, empirical information has been obtained indicating that the quality of surveys in 
developed countries has deteriorated and that discrepancies between surveys and records are explained 
by survey non-response. The number of households that do not respond to surveys, do not answer 
questions about transfers, or provide unreliable answers to questions about their income has grown. 
These problems appear more severe at the extremes of the income distribution and seemingly reduce 
the reliability of poverty rates (Meyer and Mittag, 2016; Meyer, Mok and Sullivan, 2015; Meyer, Mittag, 
and Goerge, 2018; Bruckmeier, Müller and Riphahn, 2014).
With respect to countries in the region, MDS/SAGI (2012) concludes that Brazil’s National 
Population Census found 25.9% fewer families receiving Bolsa Família and transfers from the Child 
Labour Eradication Programme (PETI) than records did. Guimarães Ferreira de Souza (2013) notes that 
the National Household Survey (PNAD) has historically captured 20% to 25% fewer families receiving 
Bolsa Família than administrative records. In the case of the Continuous Benefit Programme, the number 
of recipients according to the survey has generally been around half the official number.
Villatoro and Cecchini (2018) examined discrepancies between surveys and records in the capture 
of transfers in 15 Latin American countries between 2011 and 2015. In line with the conclusions in 
developed countries, it was found that surveys capture fewer transfers overall than records and that 
these gaps are essentially because of undercapturing of recipients rather than recipients underreporting 
transfers in surveys with respect to records.
This section updates the exercise carried out by Villatoro and Cecchini (2018) with information 
available for the period between 2008 and 2017, limiting it to the detection of gaps in the capture of 
recipients between surveys and records. With regard to conditional cash transfers, in 9 of the 15 countries 
studied, the average undercapture of recipients in the surveys was over 20% between 2008 and 2017 
(see table 5).
In Brazil, the undercapture of Bolsa Família recipients was greatest in the last three rounds of 
surveys, with the particularity that in 2016 and 2017 programme transfers were measured directly in 
the survey. In contrast, between 2008 and 2015, Bolsa Família transfers were recorded by the National 
Household Survey in a more general stream of “other income”, meaning that indirect methods must be 
used to identify recipients. One similar case is Colombia, where undercapture reached its highest levels 
in 2016 and 2017, when transfers were measured by the surveys directly. Between 2011 and 2015, 
transfers from the Más Familias en Acción programme were included in a general stream of social 
assistance transfers (government and others).
In Argentina, the undercapture rate of recipients of the Universal Child Allowance (AUH) was close 
to 50% between 2011 and 2016. Universal Child Allowance transfers are also measured through a more 
general stream of “government aid”, so recipients must be identified through proxies. In Honduras, the 
exceedingly high rate of verified undercapture is largely a result of the value for 2016, when undercapture 
was almost 100%. In addition, the indicator of undercapture varies significantly throughout the series, 
suggesting that the measurements may be unreliable.
One factor that may have a bearing on the gap between the extent to which surveys and 
administrative records capture conditional cash transfer recipients is the lack of equivalence between 
their statistical units. In surveys, the statistical unit is the household, while in many conditional cash 
transfer programmes the unit is the family. If the statistical units in records are nuclear families, table 5 
may overestimate undercapture rates, since a household may include several nuclear families.
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Table 5 
Latin America (15 countries): observed gapa between surveys and administrative records  
in the capture of conditional cash transfer recipients,b 2008 to 2017
(Percentages)
Country Programme 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average




Juancito Pinto Grant -9.0 3.8 -5.5 -5.1 4.0 0.0 -2.0
Brazil Bolsa Família -23.6c -18.0c -20.8c -26.0c -22.2c -28.1c -27.4 -29.9 -24.5
Chiled Family protection grants -18.1 -26.2 -22.2
Colombia Más Familias en Acción 
(family grant)
-25.0c -14.1c -12.8c -32.6 -34.1 -23.7
Costa Rica Avancemos -28.0 -25.1 -27.1 -21.2 -18.3 -20.8 -20.4 -17.5 -22.3
Dominican 
Republic
Progresando con Solidaridad -50.5f -10.6f -26.2f -21.9f -20.9f -7.0 -22.8
Ecuador Human Development Grant (BDH) -20.6c -19.0c -11.6c -0.9c -1.5c -6.0c 16.9c -6.1
El Salvador Comunidades Solidarias -39.2e -23.3 -37.9 -36.9 -25.8 -32.6
Honduras 10,000 Grant (called the 
Better Life Grant since 2015) 
and the Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF)
-23.6 -53.2 -48.6 -97.9 -55.8
Mexico Prospera
(formerly Progresa and 
Oportunidades)
-10.1 -14.1 -12.1 -7.0 -2.1 -9.1
Panama Opportunities Network -8.2 -6.1 -14.4 -18.9 -13.4 -6.7 -11.3
Peru National Programme of Direct 
Support for the Poorest (Juntos)
-12.2 -3.2 -22.3 1.4 -1.9 19.1 33.8 31.2 5.7
Paraguay Tekoporã -55.0e -39.0 -68.6 -14.3 -28.4 -22.7 -8.1 -7.8 -30.5
Uruguay Family Allowances–Equity Plan 11.1e -7.0 -1.9 -6.5 -8.4 -4.7 -9.9 -3.9
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of information from the Non-contributory Social Protection Programmes in 
Latin America and the Caribbean Database [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/ and Household Survey Data Bank 
(BADEHOG).
a The gap is calculated by means of the capture rate (TC), which corresponds to the following equation: ((Yeh/Yra)-1)*100. Yeh is 
the estimate on the basis of the survey and Yra is the estimate on the basis of the administrative records. A negative (positive) 
value indicates that the survey-based estimate is lower (higher) than the record-based estimate.
b Corresponds to households, except in the cases of Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Uruguay, where it corresponds 
to individuals.
c Estimate. The income item that corresponds to the programme is captured and/or recorded within a more general item, 
meaning that indirect methods must be used to identify the recipients. This entails identifying the eligible population and 
determining the ranges of possible amounts, in the case of variable programme transfers.
d Nuclear families were used to identify recipients in the surveys, rather than households. In the case of records, it was assumed 
that a family can receive only one grant.
e Values for 2009.
f It is assumed that government aid income is from the Progresando con Solidaridad programme.
In the case of social pensions, in 7 of the 12 countries studied, the average undercapture of 
recipients in the surveys was over 20% between 2008 and 2017. The countries with average undercapture 
rates of over 20% were Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, El Salvador, Mexico and Colombia (see table 6).
In Brazil, there was only direct measurement of Continuous Benefit Programme recipients in 
the surveys in 2016 and 2017. Capture of recipients in 2016 and 2017 was better than between 
2008 and 2013, but worse than in 2014 and 2015. In Paraguay, the 2017 measurement showed better 
capturing of Food Allowance recipients than in previous years. In El Salvador, undercapture increased in 
the last round, and in Mexico capture of recipients in 2014 and 2016 was lower than in previous rounds. 
In Peru, undercapture of contributory pension recipients declined sharply, while in Uruguay it remained 
relatively stable.
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Table 6 
Latin America (12 countries): observed gapa between surveys and administrative records in the 
capture of recipients of social pensions,b 2008 to 2017
(Percentages)
Country Programme 2008 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
Renta Dignidad (old-age pension) -15.0 -9.0 -12.0 -10.0 -11.0 -10.0 -11.2
Brazil Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC) -60.1c -62.8c -55.9c -57.4c -46.0c -49.6c -53.4 -54.4 -54.9
Chile Basic Solidarity Pension 0.0d -16.0 5.0 29.0 35.7 10.7
Colombia Colombia Mayor (old-age social 
protection programme)
-22.5 -20.7 -21.6
Costa Rica Non-contributory Pension Scheme -3.0 -5.0 2.0 -4.0 12.0 13.0 33.6 6.9
Ecuador Old-age Pension (part of the Human 
Development Grant (BDH)) 
-29.0c -25.0c -19.0c -13.1c -16.9c -16.2c -19.9
El Salvador Nuestros Mayores Derechos -28.0 -17.7 -17.2 -28.9 -22.9
Mexico Old-age Pension -10.1 -20.5e -16.6 -36.3 -25.6 -21.8
Panama 120 a los 65 Programme 0.9 -4.9 -1.5 -8.0 2.6 4.4 -1.1
Peru Pension 65 -58.0 -28.0 -26.0 -16.0 -6.0 -6.0 -23.3
Paraguay Food Allowance for Older 
Persons Living in Poverty
-64.8 -27.7 -33.0 -32.5 -19.5 -18.7 -32.7
Uruguay Old-age Pension -24.4 -26.6 -28.7 -23.4 -25.7
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of information from the Non-contributory Social Protection Programmes 
in Latin America and the Caribbean Database [online] http://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/ and Household Survey 
Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a The gap is calculated by means of the capture rate (CT), which corresponds to the following equation: ((Yeh/Yra)-1)*100. Yeh 
is the estimate on the basis of the survey and Yra is the estimate on the basis of the administrative records. A negative value 
indicates that the survey-based estimate is lower than the record-based estimate (undercapture). a positive value indicates that 
the survey-based estimate is higher than the record-based estimate (overcapture).
b Population aged 65 and over, except in El Salvador (70 and over) and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (60 and over). In the 
cases of Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, Costa Rica, Peru (all rounds) and Ecuador (2008, 2012 and 2013), a correction 
was made to the estimate of recipients obtained through the survey expansion factor, using census projections instead.
c Estimate. The income item that corresponds to the programme is captured and/or recorded within a more general item, 
meaning that indirect methods must be used to identify the recipients. This entails identifying the eligible population and 
determining the ranges of possible amounts, in the case of variable programme transfers.
d Value for 2009.
e Value for 2010.
Lastly, in Chile and Costa Rica, on average for the entire data series, capture of recipients of 
social pensions was higher in surveys than in administrative records. One of the factors that may affect 
these results is people systematically declaring income from other streams as social pensions.10
V. Imputation of unrecorded transfers 
and the effect on the calculated 
impact of transfers on poverty
One of the questions raised by the undercapture of recipients of social programmes is the extent to which 
this affects the calculated impact of transfers on poverty figures. We address this question through a 
simulation using data from Brazil’s 2017 National Household Survey (PNAD), as this is one of the cases 
of considerable underreporting of recipients compared to administrative records.
The simulation, based on household survey data, consists of increasing the number of transfer 
programme recipients so that the total number is equal to the figure from administrative records. This is 
10 In Chile, part of the transfers from the Solidarity-based old-age welfare contribution, a stream that is quite undercaptured in the 
survey (see ECLAC, 2018b), could be being declared as a Basic Solidarity Pension.
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done by identifying individuals or households that meet the criteria to be recipients of the programmes 
but did not report receiving income from them. If the total of actual and potential recipients in the 
household survey exceeds the total reported in administrative records, a selection criterion is applied 
to potential recipients.
The impact on poverty figures from this correction of coverage of recipients depends on several 
factors, including the extent of underrecording, the amount of the assistance provided and the accuracy 
of targeting.
Correcting the undercapture of the Bolsa Família programme has a smaller impact on the 
headcount ratios for extreme poverty and poverty (FGT0) than on their depth (FGT1) and severity 
(FGT2). In the case of extreme poverty, the extent to which the FGT1 and FGT2 indicators are reduced 
depends largely on the assumption about exclusion error. If the transfer is allocated strictly to potential 
households with lower income, the percentage reduction in FGT1 because of Bolsa Família increases 
from 34% to 52%. However, if transfers are randomly allocated (to households up to the sixth decile 
that have children), the coverage correction does not lead to a greater impact of Bolsa Família on the 
headcount ratio. The result is similar for poverty, since the coverage correction produces appreciable 
changes only in the FGT2 indicator, but not in the other indicators (see table 7).
Correcting the coverage of the Continuous Benefit Programme has a slight impact on the 
headcount ratios for extreme poverty and poverty. The differences in the FGT1 or FGT2 indicators are 
negligible (see table 8).
If both transfers are considered together (assuming a random selection of potential recipients), 
the coverage correction has a more appreciable impact on poverty indicators. For example, in the case 
of poverty, the headcount ratio would be 19.4% instead of 19.9% (see table 9).
Although Brazil has one of the highest levels of underreporting of recipients among the countries 
analysed, this does not significantly affect the conclusions on the role of transfers in poverty reduction.
Table 7 
Brazil: extreme poverty and poverty rates in different coverage scenarios  
for the Bolsa Família programme, 2017





























Headcount ratio (FGT0 ) 7.2 5.5 5.3 5.5 21.3 19.9 19.8 19.7 
Change compared to 
the situation without 
transfers (percentages)
-23 -26 -24 -6 -7 -8
Gap (FGT1 ) 3.9 2.6 1.9 2.4 9.0 7.6 7.0 7.4 
Change compared to 
the situation without 
transfers (percentages)
-34 -52 -37 -16 -22 -18
Gap squared (FGT2 ) 2.9 1.8 0.9 1.7 5.7 4.4 3.7 4.2 
Change compared to 
the situation without 
transfers (percentages)
-36 -69 -41 -23 -35 -26
Recipient households 
(millions)
9.5 13.6 13.6 9.5 13.6 13.6 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of the National Household Survey (PNAD), 2017.
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Table 8 
Brazil: extreme poverty and poverty rates in different coverage scenarios  
for the Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC), 2017



















Headcount ratio (FGT0 ) 6.5 5.5 5.4 21.2 19.9 19.7 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-15 -17 -6 -7
Gap (FGT1 ) 3.0 2.6 2.5 8.4 7.6 7.4 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-16 -19 -10 -12
Gap squared (FGT2 ) 2.1 1.8 1.8 5.0 4.4 4.3 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-14 -18 -13 -15
Recipients (millions) 0.9 2.0 0.9 2.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of the National Household Survey (PNAD), 2017.
Table 9 
Brazil: extreme poverty and poverty rates in different coverage scenarios for Bolsa Família  
and the Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC), 2017



















Headcount ratio (FGT0) 8.2 5.5 5.3 22.6 19.9 19.4 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-33 -35 -12 -14
Gap (FGT1) 4.4 2.6 2.3 9.9 7.6 7.3 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-42 -47 -24 -27
Gap squared (FGT2) 3.2 1.8 1.6 6.4 4.4 4.1 
Change compared to the situation 
without transfers (percentages)
-43 -51 -32 -36
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of the National Household Survey (PNAD), 2017.
VI. Conclusions
Over the past 20 years, non-contributory cash transfers have been a key instrument of social policies to 
help people overcome poverty in most Latin American countries. Analysis of 15 countries in the region 
shows that both conditional cash transfers and social pensions contribute to lower rates of poverty and 
extreme poverty. Specifically, data from around 2017 show that, in terms of a simple average for the 
region, the combination of these monetary transfers resulted in extreme poverty and poverty being 1.7 
and 2.0 percentage points lower, respectively, than they would have been if households had not had 
this source of income (equivalent to relative decreases of 25.9% and 11.8%, respectively).
The data also show that household surveys underrecord the number of transfer recipients, which 
could lead to underestimation of the impact on poverty, especially when using indicators that take into 
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account the level and distribution of income of people living in poverty, such as the depth (FGT1) and 
severity (FGT2) indicators. However, as can be seen in the case of Brazil, low transfer amounts mean that 
the impact on the poverty headcount ratio is less underestimated, validating the aptness of household 
surveys as instruments for analysing the impact of non-contributory monetary transfers on poverty.
In a context of growing poverty and extreme poverty (ECLAC, 2021), it is essential to strengthen 
non-contributory cash transfers in the countries of the region. To achieve this, it is advisable to increase 
transfer amounts to close the poverty gap, expand coverage to reach those living in poverty and those 
who are at high risk of falling into poverty, and effectively coordinate with other social programmes, 
within a framework of universal and comprehensive social protection systems.
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Annex A1
Table A1.1 
Latin America (15 countries): survey questions and variables for capturing  
non-contributory transfers, around 2017
Country/year Programmea Measurement of receipt of transfers
Variables with the income 
stream in the database Estimation notes
Argentina, 2017 Universal Child 
Allowance (AUH)
Indirect. Question used: 
Do you receive a subsidy 
or social assistance from 
the government?
v5_m - Approximate monthly amounts 
of the AUH are used.
- Filter for eligible households: 
at least one person aged 0–18.
Other subsidies Indirect. Question used: 
Do you receive a subsidy 
or social assistance from 
the government?
v5_m - Filter for eligible households: 
no persons aged 0–18.




Juancito Pinto Grant Direct, without asking 
for the amount.
bonojpi_i - The income is allocated and 
converted into a monthly amount.








Other subsidies Direct. v5003a2
Chile, 2017 Chile Solidario
Ethical Family Income (IEF)
Direct.
Fixed amount grants. The 
amount is not asked.
y2201, y2202, y2203, 
y2204, y2205, y2301, 
y2302, y2303, 
y2502, y2506
- Fixed-rate grants: the 
amount is allocated.







Fixed amount grants. The 
amount is not asked.
y2601, y2604 - The amount is allocated.
Other subsidies Direct.
Fixed amount grants. The 
amount is not asked.
y2001, y2002, y2003, 
y2004, y2005, y2302, 
y2401, y2501, y2503, 
y2504, y2505, y2507
- Fixed-rate grants: the 
amount is allocated.
- Variable grants: self-reported 
and payment receipts.
Colombia, 2017 Más Familias en 
Acción (family grant)
Direct. p1661s1a1




age social protection 
programme)
Direct. p1661s3a1
Costa Rica, 2017 Non-contributory 
Pension Scheme
Direct. trnc, taprnc
Avancemos Direct. timas Type of grant (a9a) = 1.
Other subsidies (transfer 
from the Joint Institute 
for Social Aid (IMAS), 
education grants, others)
Direct. ts, timas, tbc Type of grant (a9a) <> 
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Table A1 .1
Country/year Programmea Measurement of receipt of transfers
Variables with the income 
stream in the database Estimation notes




p76 Filter: the eligible population is 
people under 65 years of age.
Human Development 
Grant — Older Persons
Direct, without 
separating by grant.
p76 Filter: the eligible population 
is people aged 65 and over.
Joaquín Gallegos Grant Direct. p78
El Salvador, 
2017
Comunidades Solidarias Direct. r44506_i Filter: the eligible population is 
people under 70 years of age.
Basic Universal Pension Direct. r44506_i Filter: the eligible population 
is people aged 70 and over.
Other subsidies Indirect. r44506_i Filter: non-recipients of 
Comunidades Solidarias and 
Universal Basic Pension.
Honduras, 2016 Better Life Grant Direct. oih14_i
Grant for people with
disabilities, education 
grants, other government 
programmes
Direct. oih9_i, oih12_i, oih16_i
Mexico, 2016 Prospera Direct. yp042
Old-age Pension Direct. yp044
Programme of 




grants, No Hunger Card, 
other programmes for 
older persons, other 
social programmes
Direct. yp038, yp043, yp045, 
yp046, yp047, yp048
Panama, 2017 Opportunities Network,
Grant for Food Purchase 
programme
Direct. p56_g1, p56_g2
120 a los 65 Programme Direct. p56_g5
Universal Grant, Public 
Institution Grant, Guardian 
Angel programme
Direct. p56_g6, p56_f2, p56_f1
Peru, 2017 National Programme 
of Direct Support for 
the Poorest (Juntos)
Direct. d5566c
Pensión 65 Direct. d5567c
Paraguay, 2017 Tekoporã Direct. e01ide
Old-age Food Allowance Direct. e01kde
Solidarity Programme 
for the Protection 
of Older Persons
Direct. gob_proteccion_vejez_monto




Old-age or disability 
pension
Direct. pen_i Filter: population that 
reported receiving old-age 
or disability pensions.
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Household Survey Data Bank (BADEHOG).
a In some cases, the names do not identify programmes, but income streams.
